Abbi Labs

Breach breakdowns

Breakdown: 22 GitHub repos told AI coding agents to run a credential stealer, and not to read it first

By Abbi Labs · Published 20 November 2026

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Cloning a repo and asking Claude Code or Cursor to "get this running" is about the most normal thing a vibe coder does. On 17 November 2026, Bitdefender Labs published a campaign built around exactly that habit. It found 22 malicious GitHub links whose project instruction files, the AGENTS.md and CLAUDE.md files your agent reads to learn about a repo, tell the agent to run a script called setup.js. They describe it as sealed and signed, and tell the agent not to read it, not to show its output and not to ask you first. The script is a credential stealer that also tries to spread.

Everything below comes from Bitdefender's write-up, with The Injection and PlayCISO summaries as cross-checks. Where something isn't public, I say so. I'm not naming the repos here. Some look like accounts that may themselves have been compromised, and Bitdefender lists them with file hashes in its indicator table.

What happened

The numbers

What's confirmed and what we don't know

How to check before you open a repo

Do this for any repo you didn't write, before you open it in an AI tool or trust the folder. It takes two minutes.

  1. See which agent files it ships. In the cloned folder, before opening it in your editor:
    ls -la AGENTS.md CLAUDE.md .cursorrules .windsurfrules .mcp.json \
      .claude .cursor .gemini .vscode/tasks.json .github/copilot-instructions.md 2>/dev/null
    A small app template rarely needs most of these. Each one you find, open and read.
  2. Look for the red-flag phrasing. Instructions not to read a file, to hide output or to skip confirmation are the tell Bitdefender describes:
    grep -rniE "sealed|do not (read|inspect|display)|without (asking|confirmation|displaying)|setup\.(js|mjs)" \
      AGENTS.md CLAUDE.md .cursorrules .claude .cursor .gemini .github .vscode 2>/dev/null
  3. Read the hooks and MCP servers. Open .claude/settings.json and look at any hooks block, then .mcp.json and .vscode/tasks.json. Anything that runs node, bun, curl or a script on open or at session start needs a reason you understand.
  4. Check the script it points to. A multi-megabyte single-line JavaScript file in a small project is not normal. Don't run it to "see what it does".

If you think you ran one

  1. Check your own agent configs for planted entries.
    grep -rlE "setup\.(js|mjs)" ~/.claude ~/.cursor ~/.codex ~/.gemini ~/.config 2>/dev/null
    Then read your global agent settings and MCP config for hooks or servers you didn't add.
  2. Check your repos for commits you didn't make. In each repo you can push to:
    git fetch --all && git log --all --since="2026-10-01" --name-only -- \
      AGENTS.md CLAUDE.md .cursorrules .cursor .claude .mcp.json .vscode .github
  3. Rotate, in this order. GitHub/GitLab tokens and SSH keys first (they're how it spreads), then npm/PyPI tokens, cloud keys, then every key in your .env files (Stripe, Supabase service_role, OpenAI and so on). Deleting the repo doesn't un-steal anything.
  4. Compare against Bitdefender's indicator table (repo names and setup.js hashes) in the original post.

Check the side strangers can already see

A stealer needs to get onto your machine. Keys shipped in your live site don't, anyone can open your JavaScript. Paste your URL and Abbi Labs checks what a signed-out visitor can see: secret-looking keys in your JavaScript, exposed .env and .git, open Supabase tables. Read-only.

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How to make this harder next time

  1. Turn off auto-approve for unfamiliar repos. The first route only works if the agent can run node scripts/setup.js without you seeing the command. Keep command approval on until you've read the repo's agent files.
  2. Don't trust the folder by reflex. The trust prompt is what lets project hooks run. Read .claude/settings.json and the other files above first.
  3. Treat agent files like code. AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, rules files, hooks, MCP configs and editor tasks can all lead to commands running. Review them in pull requests the same way you'd review a workflow file.
  4. Keep long-lived secrets off the dev box where you can. Fewer plain-text keys in .env files and shell profiles means less to steal. Use scoped, expiring tokens, and spend caps on AI and payment keys. See API keys in mcp.json.
  5. Try strangers' code somewhere disposable. A container, VM or cloud dev box with no personal credentials is the right place to "just see if it runs".

My take

This one doesn't need a bug in any AI tool. It needs a text file that sounds like a strict security policy, and an agent that's allowed to run commands without you watching. "Don't read this file, just run it" would make any human suspicious. Agents follow it because it reads like a rule. Two minutes reading a cloned repo's agent files before you open it, and command approval left on, take most of the risk out.

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Sources

Related

Weekly AI-app security checklist

One short email a week: a practical check for apps built with Supabase, Next.js and AI tools (RLS, leaked keys, headers and more). Unsubscribe anytime.