Abbi Labs

Breach breakdowns

Breakdown: a GitHub issue told OpenAI's Codex bot to run code, and the chain reached Codex's npm release

By Abbi Labs · Published 18 November 2026

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Plenty of us have added an AI bot to a GitHub repo. It labels new issues, reviews pull requests, or answers comments. It feels harmless, because all it does is read text. On 11 November 2026, the security firm Depi showed what that text can do. Anyone with a GitHub account could open an issue on OpenAI's own Codex repository, and the AI issue labeler would read the title and body as part of its prompt. Depi turned that into code execution, then into the runner's tokens, then into a poisoned build cache, and finally into a path to publishing the official @openai/codex package on npm. OpenAI fixed it the same day the write-up went out.

Everything below comes from Depi's write-up, the Bugcrowd disclosure, and OpenAI's fix in the public openai/codex repo. Where something isn't public, I say so.

What happened

The numbers

What's confirmed and what we don't know

How to check your own repo

Only check repos you own or are responsible for. This takes about ten minutes.

  1. Find every AI step in your workflows. Run this in the repo root:
    grep -rnE "codex-action|claude-code-action|copilot|openai|anthropic|gemini|allow-users|allowed_non_write_users" .github/workflows
    If you used Cursor, Claude Code, Lovable or similar to set up CI, check this even if you don't remember adding an AI step.
  2. Check what triggers it. For each hit, look at the on: block. issues, issue_comment, pull_request_target and discussion can all be fired by strangers on a public repo. Then look for text they control going into the prompt:
    grep -rnE "github.event.(issue|comment|pull_request|discussion).(title|body)" .github/workflows
  3. Check who's allowed. A wildcard such as allow-users: "*" means anyone. Remove it, or list the exact people. The Codex action's default is people with write access, which is the safer place to be.
  4. Check what the job can reach. Look at permissions: and the secrets.* used in the same job. A bot that reads issues should not sit next to deploy keys, npm tokens, cloud credentials or id-token: write.

Check the side strangers can already see

CI tokens are one way out. Keys shipped in your live site are another, and anyone can find those without writing a clever issue. Paste your URL and Abbi Labs checks what a signed-out visitor can see: secret-looking keys in your JavaScript, exposed .env and .git, open Supabase tables. Read-only.

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How to fix it

  1. Give the bot no tools if it only needs to answer. That's exactly what OpenAI did. For labeling, summarizing or triage, call the model API directly, turn tools off, ask for strict JSON, and check the answer against a list of allowed values before you act on it. No shell, no file writes.
  2. Limit who can trigger it. Run AI steps only for collaborators, or only after a maintainer adds a label. Don't use wildcards for who's allowed to run the agent.
  3. Strip the job's permissions. Set the minimum at the top of the workflow and give the bot only what it needs:
    permissions:
      contents: read
      issues: write   # only if it has to label
    
    # no secrets.NPM_TOKEN, deploy keys or id-token: write in this job
  4. Keep untrusted jobs away from release jobs. Publish from a separate workflow that only runs on tags or a protected branch, needs a human approval (a GitHub environment with required reviewers), and doesn't restore caches that other workflows can write to.
  5. Treat issue and PR text as untrusted input. Same rule as form input on your site. If you have to put it in a prompt, keep it clearly marked as data, and assume a determined person can still get the model to follow it. Your safety comes from what the agent can't do, not from the prompt.
  6. Add a short cooldown on agent CLI updates. Depi's advice: update fast, but not the second a release drops, especially for tools that auto-update and run with your credentials. A delay setting such as minimumReleaseAge in pnpm or Renovate is one way to do that.
  7. Rotate if in doubt. If an AI step that strangers could trigger ever shared a job with secrets, rotate those secrets. See secret keys in git history and service_role key exposed.

My take

No memory bug, no zero-day in GitHub. It started with a sentence in an issue that a bot was built to read. The labeler only needed to pick a few labels, but it had a shell and sat on a runner next to tokens that mattered. That's the pattern to look for in your own repo: an AI step that reads stranger-written text and can do more than reply. Cut its tools, cut its permissions, keep it away from anything that publishes, and that same issue just gets a label.

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Sources

Related

Weekly AI-app security checklist

One short email a week: a practical check for apps built with Supabase, Next.js and AI tools (RLS, leaked keys, headers and more). Unsubscribe anytime.