Abbi Labs

Breach breakdowns

Breakdown: keys pasted into old Cursor agent sessions led to a fake Claude Code extension

By Pritesh Ghodge, security engineer · Published 16 November 2026

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Most of us have done it. The agent can't reach the database, so you paste the connection string into the chat. The deploy fails, so you drop the API key in and say "use this". It works, you move on, and the key now lives in a session log you never think about again. Cursor's incident report from 13 November 2026 shows how far that can travel. Old coding agent traces, some with credentials nobody had redacted, sat in a storage bucket shared with a vendor. When the vendor's access key leaked, those credentials became the attacker's way in, and it ended with a backdoored copy of the Claude Code extension in Cursor's marketplace.

Everything below comes from Cursor's own two posts (the 29 October security notice and the 13 November update) and BleepingComputer and The Hacker News coverage of the update. Where something isn't public, I say so.

What happened

The numbers

All from Cursor's 13 November update unless marked:

What's confirmed and what we don't know

How to check your own machine

Only check machines you own or are responsible for. If you installed or updated the Claude Code extension from Cursor's marketplace on macOS or Windows on 29 October 2026, do this now. If not, skip to the next section, which applies to everyone.

  1. Look for the attacker's key (Cursor's own check):
    # macOS / Linux
    grep -qs svc-telemetry ~/.ssh/authorized_keys && echo "svc-telemetry key found" || echo "No key found"
    
    # Windows PowerShell
    $files = "$HOME\.ssh\authorized_keys", "C:\ProgramData\ssh\administrators_authorized_keys" | Where-Object { Test-Path $_ }
    if ($files -and (Select-String svc-telemetry $files)) { "svc-telemetry key found" } else { "No key found" }
  2. Look for persistence. On macOS, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.sysmond.plist and ~/.config/.smt. On Windows, a scheduled task named SysMon or sysmon.cmd in your Startup folder. The full list of indicators is in Cursor's notice.
  3. If anything turns up, uninstalling isn't enough. The payload drops scripts that keep running on their own. Run Cursor's remediation script for your platform, consider rebuilding the machine, and rotate every credential that machine could reach, from a different, trusted computer.

Check the other end too

A key in an old agent session is one way out. A key shipped in your live site is another, and anyone can find that one. Paste your URL and Abbi Labs checks what a signed-out stranger can see: secret-looking keys in your JavaScript, exposed .env and .git, open Supabase tables. Read-only.

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What to change, whatever tool you use

The extension was the scary part, but the root cause is ordinary: real secrets typed into agent chats and support tickets, kept for months, then copied somewhere you never see. Cursor isn't the only tool that stores sessions. Here's what I'd do this week.

  1. Rotate anything you ever pasted into an agent chat or a support ticket. Database URLs, Stripe keys, OpenAI or Anthropic keys, Supabase service_role keys. If you can't remember, assume yes for the ones that matter. For Supabase, follow the service_role key exposed guide.
  2. Check your data-sharing setting. Only sessions outside Privacy Mode were in the exposed bucket. In Cursor, check Privacy Mode is on (on team plans, ask your admin to enforce it). In other AI coding tools, look for the setting that lets them use your sessions for training, and turn it off for work that touches real credentials.
  3. Give the agent the name, not the value. Keep secrets in .env (gitignored) or your secrets manager and tell the agent to use process.env.DATABASE_URL or $DATABASE_URL. If it needs to run something with a key, let the shell fill it in:
    # bad: the key is now in the chat log
    curl -H "Authorization: Bearer sk_live_51H..." https://api.stripe.com/v1/charges
    
    # better: the log only ever shows the variable name
    curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $STRIPE_SECRET_KEY" https://api.stripe.com/v1/charges
  4. Use scoped, capped keys for agent work. A restricted Stripe key, a read-only database role, an AI provider key with a monthly spend limit. Where the provider supports it, lock keys to your IP or network, which is one of the fixes Cursor applied to its own service providers. A stolen key that only works from your server, with a $50 cap, is a much smaller problem.
  5. Treat extension updates like dependency updates. Install from the publisher's official listing, notice when an extension you rely on updates, and be suspicious of a coding agent extension that suddenly asks for more than it used to. Cursor's notice is a good reminder that a trusted name in a marketplace isn't proof of who built that version.
  6. Scan more than your repos. Cursor added secret scanning to its code repos and "other internal data sources". Do the same at your scale: run a secret scanner over your repo history, your .cursor/ and .claude/ folders, exported chat logs and anything you paste into tickets. See secret keys in git history and API keys in mcp.json.

My take

The chain here is long: vendor key, training bucket, old traces, SaaS tools, marketplace cache, your laptop. But the first link that matters to you is short. Someone pasted a live credential into an agent session, and nobody redacted it. You can't control how a vendor stores its keys. You can control whether your agent chats contain anything worth stealing. Rotate what you've pasted, switch the agent to variable names, and put a spend cap on every AI key you own.

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Sources

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Weekly AI-app security checklist

One short email a week: a practical check for apps built with Supabase, Next.js and AI tools (RLS, leaked keys, headers and more). Unsubscribe anytime.